Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring is a research paper published in The Review of Economic Studies (1984). On theSindex it has a DataRank of 1.4. It has been cited 8,426 times.
This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.
FAIR checklist signals are shown for context only and do not affect DataRank scoring.
Base Score Contribution
1.4
From this paper's citation signal
Citation Network Contribution
0
Citation network not refreshed for this result
This paper's DataRank is currently driven only by its base citation score. Citation network data was not refreshed for this result.
Learn more about DataRank methodology →DataRank blends this paper's own citation count with the influence of the papers that cite it. Here, roughly 100% comes from its base citations and 0% from the citation network.
Citers are pulled from OpenAlex sorted by cited_by_count:descand capped per paper, so when the cap binds we keep the highest-signal references and the score is reproducible across reruns.